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ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY AND THE
TENSION BETWEEN CORPORATE AND
CRIMINAL LAW
Miriam H. Baer*
INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 2010, Brooklyn Law School brought together a
group of psychologists, philosophers, and corporate criminal law
experts to explore the implications of blaming corporate groups.
During the afternoon session, I had the pleasure of moderating a
roundtable discussion that included Professors James Fanto, Peter
Henning, and Leonard Orland. The essays that follow are our
reactions to the wide range of topics we covered with regard to
organizational criminal liability.
As the Symposium itself demonstrated, corporate criminal
liability continues to be an important and complex topic in public
discourse. Our preoccupation reflects our intuition that wrongdoers
ought to be punished, and our uneasy relationship with large,
powerful corporate organizations. We fear both the harms that
corporate organizations can produce (British Petroleum's massive
oil spill being the most recent example), and the agglomeration of
economic power that they represent. These fears have led us to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn, Law School; J.D. 1996, Harvard Law
School; A.B. 1993, Princeton University; Assistant United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York 1999-2004 and Assistant General Counsel for
Compliance, Verizon, 2004-2005. I am grateful to Jim Fanto, Peter Henning,
and Leonard Orland, who participated in this Symposium. Their roundtable
comments, as well as comments and conversations with Dana Brakman-Reiser,
Michael Cahill, Ted Janger, and Larry Solan, greatly furthered this project.
Thanks as well are due to President Joan Wexler and Brooklyn Law School for
hosting this Symposium.
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adopt various mechanisms for restraining corporate conduct.
Corporate criminal liability has become, over the years, one of the
most important of these mechanisms because it stems not only
from theories of restraint, but also from notions of group blame.'
The legal equivalent of one-stop shopping, it promises
consequential, retributive and expressive benefits, all at the same
time.
Drawing on psychology and organizational management
literature, Professor Fanto's piece explores the extent to which
group dynamics explain corporate malfeasance and, therefore,
justify the need for corporate criminal liability.2 Professor Henning
focuses on several recent cases, which demonstrate criminal
liability's imperfect potential for corporate rehabilitation. 3
Together, their comments demonstrate the pragmatic benefits and
drawbacks of employing the corporate unit as the measure of group
blame. If we blame the corporation, we can (supposedly) improve
the organizational dynamics that led to its decline. On the other
hand, if we blame the corporation, we may (sometimes) impose
4
rehabilitative regimes that are less helpful than we presume.
In my own contribution, I want to suggest that corporate
criminal liability, as currently constituted in federal jurisdictions,
fails to perform the sorting and rehabilitation mechanism that
Professors Fanto and Henning envision. That is, as a legal matter,
corporate criminal liability is so broad that it cannot possibly
1 See generally Samuel Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal
Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006). For a proposal for using civilly-imposed
punitive damages to express moral condemnation, see generally Dan Markel,
Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009), and Dan Markel, How Should Punitive
Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009).
2 James Fanto, Organizational Liability, 19 J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming Fall
2010).
3 Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment
Matter?, 19 J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming Fall 2010).
4 To this end, the two essays demonstrate the problem that deterrence
strategies in criminal law "may have hidden crimogenic costs-that is, they may
generate crime in unexpected ways." Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At its Worst
When Doing its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951 (2003).
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identify those corporations whose cultures are particularly corrupt.
As a result, corporate criminal liability is not, by itself, a
particularly good vehicle for rehabilitating corporate culture;
instead, prosecutors must fill that gap by screening a few
"unworthy" corporations from a multitude of entities that
technically qualify for criminal charges.6 As a result, federal
prosecutors acquire an oversized role in governing corporate
entities, with little to no oversight from the courts or the public.
I. THE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
Under our federal law's respondeat superior theory of criminal
liability, corporations may be held liable for their employee's
crimes, provided the employee acted in the scope of her authority
and acted with an intention to benefit the corporation.! The
Supreme Court originally justified such liability on grounds that
there existed no other way to restrain business entities, who were
growing in size and power at the turn of the 2 0 th century during the
5 See Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone
Wrong?, 1517 PLI/CoRP. 815, 817 (2005) (describing broad scope of corporate
criminal liability).
6 In a 2005 presentation before the Practicing Law Institute, former United
States Attorney Mary Jo White bluntly reminded her audience of this fact:
On the federal level especially, the sweep of corporate criminal liability
could hardly be broader. All of you in this audience probably know the
law well, but its breathtaking scope always bears repeating: If a single
employee, however low down in the corporate hierarchy, commits a
crime in the course of his or her employment, even in part to benefit the
corporation, the corporate employer is criminally liable for that
employee's crime. It is essentially absolute liability.
Id.
7 See generally N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481 (1909). For early discussions of respondeat superior corporate criminal
liability, see generally John C. Coffee Jr., Does Unlawful Mean "Criminal"?
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment
of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REv. 307, 313
(1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick:" An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REv. 386 (1981).
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industrial revolution.8 Today, however, those concerns are rather
quaint;9 a host of administrative agencies and civil liability can
restrain corporate wrongdoing and reduce harmful externalities.
Why, then, does corporate criminal liability not only persist, but in
fact flourish?
Corporate criminal liability relies on what some might call a
"communitarian" view of the corporation, which posits that the
corporation is a social institution with an identifiable personality.'o
The communitarian vision of the firm is at odds with the dominant
view among corporate scholars and jurists, which is that the
corporation is little more than a nexus of contracts."
If the contractarian view dominates the world of corporate law,
then the communitarian view most surely governs criminal law. As
the presentations and comments during the Trager Symposium
demonstrated, the communitarian view is supported by more than
just scholarly opinion; it also appears to be fueled by powerful
societal intuitions.12 We can credibly blame the financial
N Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 212 U.S. at 495 (reasoning that criminal
liability is necessary to restrain corporate wrongdoing).
9 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1477, 1486 (1996) (theorizing that corporate
criminal liability may have served a "useful purpose" prior to the emergence of
strong civil enforcement regimes).
10 See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 407, 455 (2006). "Communitarians insist that corporations
have political and social dimensions as well as the obvious economic
dimension." Another view of the corporation is that it is the equivalent of a
living, sentient animal. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the
Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1374-76 (2009)
(describing and critiquing theory of corporate punishment that posits a
corporation as the equivalent of a human being).
"' William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993).
The dominant legal academic view does not describe the corporation as
a social institution. Rather, the corporation is seen as the market writ
small, a web of ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) between various
real persons. The notion that corporations are 'persons' is seen as a
weak and unimportant fiction..
Id.
12 David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium, Sharing the Blame: The Law
and Morality of Punishing Collective Entities (Feb. 5, 2010) (unpublished
4
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institution known as "Goldman Sachs" because we believe, on
multiple levels, that Goldman Sachs is an identifiable entity. It
means something to refer to "Goldman Sachs" and not "Citibank"
or "Morgan Stanley," just as it feels different to work for Goldman
Sachs than it does to work for some other institution. Indeed, it
feels different to work for any financial institution than it does to
work for any corporation in some other industry, and so forth. It is
that feeling, often referred to as "corporate culture," that allows
prosecutors both to generate narratives of corporate blame (i.e., the
"greedy culture" at Goldman led to excessive risk-taking and
allegedly fraudulent conduct) and invoke notions of just desserts. 13
The communitarian view also enables prosecutors to argue that
criminal law provides better tools with which to punish or reform
the previously identified "corporate culture."l 4
Unfortunately, the communitarian approach, as expressed
through respondeat superior liability, does not do a very good job
of taking into account differences between firms. Consider two
primary arguments one might make in defense of a corporation
whose employees have violated the law:
-Don't blame us. Blame our employees or officers. This is
a variant of a "rogue employee" argument, whereby the
company as a whole should not suffer the direct and
indirect costs of a criminal indictment, simply because a
"rogue" employee made unauthorized decisions (and
sometimes went to great lengths to hide those decisions)
while in the company's employ.' 5 One should note,
however, that many of the cases that make the morning
transcript) (on file with Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law & Policy).
13 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing
Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1095 (1991) (arguing that
existence of an identifiable corporate ethos justifies imposition of punishment
and criminal liability).
14 Id. at 1123-27.
15 True, corporations often must pay civil and administrative penalties
when rogue employees, acting within the scope of their authority, cause harm to
others. But civil and administrative penalties will often pale in comparison to the
reputation and collateral costs of a federal criminal indictment. See Miriam
Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1062-63 (2008)
(citing collateral costs of corporate indictment).
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papers and evening news are not mere "rogue employee"
cases. Rather, multiple actors appear to bear varying levels
of culpability for indirect encouragement or lax oversight
of violations of law.
-Don't punish us. We are just shareholders. The second
contention is that whatever the culpability of the
corporation's employees and officers, criminal corporate
liability imposes improper burdens on diffuse and largely
innocent shareholders. This argument is most applicable to
publicly held corporations whose managers have engaged
in some variety of corporate fraud. The "shareholders will
be harmed" argument contends that rather than hurting
some abstract entity, criminal penalties hurt the
corporation's very (human) shareholders, who usually have
had nothing to do with the underlying wrongdoing and
indeed may have been the primary victims of
wrongdoing. 16
As a legal matter, neither claim is relevant within the federal
system. Corporate criminal liability attaches regardless of whether
the employee has violated explicit company rules,17 or whether the
company's shareholders shared in the corporate employee's ill-
begotten profits.' 8
As a practical matter, however, the issue is more complex.
16 See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked,
Homeless and Without Wheels: " Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies and the
Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 627,
632 (2007). For a similar argument in the securities class action context, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1537 (2006)
(observing that securities class action penalty "falls perversely on the victim").
17 See OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS MANUAL, TITLE 9, CHAPTER 9-28.000 15, available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf (citing, e.g., United
States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a
corporation can be held criminally responsible even when its employee's
conduct was "against corporate policy or express instructions")).
18 Id. at 2-3 (citing authority for the principle that agent must only act with
partial intent to benefit corporation and that actual benefit is not necessary for
imposition of criminal liability).
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Prosecutors clearly do take into account the extent to which the
employee appears to be "just a rogue," or in fact a member of an
institution whose culture demands increased profits at all costs.19
Moreover, prosecutors and regulators clearly do take into account
the extent to which the company's shareholders were themselves
the victims of a corporate crime, and whether they would suffer
additionally from the entity's criminal prosecution. 20 Because
prosecutors are known to make these screening decisions,
companies retain incentives to employ strong oversight
mechanisms (or at least mechanisms most likely to please
prosecutors), 21 and to argue that prosecution is undesirable where
shareholders are most likely to shoulder the costs of a criminal
indictment.
When the government does take these arguments into account,
it does not necessarily decline prosecution and call it a day.
Instead, it may enter a deferred or non-prosecution agreement,
whereby the company agrees to pay extensive fines, cease certain
activities, agree to an outside monitor, and engage in additional
reforms set out by the relevant prosecutor.22
19 Id. at 4 (directing prosecutors to consider, among other factors, "the
pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation").
20 Id. (directing prosecutors to consider, among other factors, "collateral
consequences [of prosecuting], including whether there is disproportionate harm
to shareholders [and other constituents] and others not proven personally
culpable"). The SEC also has indicated its unwillingness to bring corporate-wide
enforcement actions that would disproportionately harm shareholders. See Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE
RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, RELEASE No. 44969, 76 SEC DOCKET 296 (Oct. 23, 2001)
(more commonly known as the "Seaboard Report"), available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm#P 16_499 ("[T]he paramount issue
in every enforcement judgment is, and must be, what best protects investors.").
The SEC and Department of Justice have potentially conflicting interests insofar
as the SEC sees its mission as the protection of investors whereas the
Department of Justice serves the general public.
21 See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L.
REv. 949, 990-92 (2009) [hereinafter Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance].
22 For a discussion of deferred prosecution agreements and the manner by
which they are negotiated, see generally Leonard Orland, The Transformation of
Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006); Brandon
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Thus, we see an interesting divergence between the legal and
practical implications of the communitarian view of corporate
wrongdoing; the federal law ignores arguments such as prevalence
of wrongdoing and damage to shareholders, but prosecutors may
credit them.23 The problem, however, is that the government's
response is entirely discretionary.24 Government prosecutors may
take these issues into account, but they have no legal obligation to
do so. 25 Moreover, when they do take these arguments into
account, government actors are relatively unbound by legal
institutions-administrative or legal-that ensure transparency,
accountability, and uniformity.26 Indeed, they may be making
L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REv. 853 (2007)
(describing nature of deferred and non-prosecution agreements); Lawrence D.
Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of
Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2006).
23 "[I]n the shadow of a strikingly broad de jure rule of liability that is
nearly indistinguishable from its civil counterparts, the criminal system's actors
gradually have developed a practice of imposing enterprise liability that looks
much narrower . . . ." Buell, supra note 1, at 476. State laws are more
constrained in their definition of corporate criminal liability. See Alschuler,
supra note 10, at 1364, 1364 n.35 (citing Model Penal Code and state codes).
24 Prosecutorial discretion has been more broadly criticized in Stephanos
Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REv. 959 (2009), declaring in the opening sentence: "No government
official has as much unreviewable power or discretion as the prosecutor." Id. at
959. Professor Pamela Bucy, a former federal prosecutor, has commented that
the three aspects of the job that surprised her were the solemnity of the
courtroom, the amount of resources available for investigation and prosecution,
and "the amount of power [she] and every prosecutor had." Pamela H. Bucy,
Moral Messengers: Delegating Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMU L. REV. 321, 321
(2006).
25 Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul:
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 53, 86-87 (2007).
No amount of supplication, therefore, can overcome the mercilessness
of the applicable legal doctrines; so long as there is a hint of criminality
by even a single lowly employee, the corporation's counsel has no
leverage and no bargaining power. Only the prosecutor can be merciful,
and for his mercy the corporation rationally chooses to cooperate in any
way demanded.
Id.
26 Prosecutorial discretion of this type is subject neither to judicial
8
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decisions for which they have little expertise or competence.27
It should come as no surprise, then, that unbound government
actors sometimes incur agency costs. 28 Since government actors
have no obligation to recognize rogue employee or shareholder-
victim arguments, they can extract personally and politically
valuable compensation for doing so. 29 Ordinarily, the required
payment is the company's willingness to cooperate in the
prosecution of individual employees, as well as its commitment to
enact certain reforms and policies. 30 To the extent these reforms
oversight nor to the administrative restraints set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act. See Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, supra note 21, at
976-79 (describing breadth of prosecutorial discretion).
27 Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting
Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW To REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT,
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel Barkow eds., forthcoming NYU Press 2011)
("Prosecutors rarely have sufficient experience working in any business, much
less adequate industry-specific expertise, to make these decisions reliably.")
(manuscript on file with Brooklyn Journal of Law &Policy).
28 "Agency costs" are the costs incurred when the principal's interest
diverges with those of the agent. To eliminate the agent's bad conduct, the
principal must expend resources monitoring and bonding the agent. In the
corporate crime context, prosecutors in some instances were accused of taking
actions for their benefit and not for the benefit of shareholders or even society at
large. For example, when the United States Attorney for New Jersey signed a
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Bristol Myers Squibb that required
Squibb to donate money to Seton Hall Law School (the United States Attorney's
alma mater), the payment was denounced as nothing more than a coercive
wealth transfer with no real value for shareholders or the community. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28,
2006, at A14 (criticizing DPA's requirement that Bristol Myers Squibb endow a
chair in business ethics). This behavior also is an example of "rent seeking" in
that the prosecutor allegedly used his power to extract transfer from one party
(Squibb) to another (Seton Hall), rather than securing reforms that would
increase wealth or at least compensate victims. For more on agency costs and
rent-seeking behavior, see WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST 66-69,
87-93 (2007).
29 For additional examples of the principal-agent problem as it relates to
prosecutors, see Bibas, supra note 24, at 963 (discussing principal-agent
problem with regard to plea bargaining and charging decisions).
30 For examples of deferred prosecution agreements, see authorities cited
supra note 22.
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accelerate the identification and prosecution of individuals who
have transgressed criminal law, corporate criminal liability
provides useful benefits, some of which Professor Henning rightly
refers to in his Essay.31
There is, however, a negative side to corporate criminal
liability, which, concededly, corporate defenders may be a bit too
eager to point out. 32 Sometimes the government's proposed
rehabilitation has little to do with eliminating criminal conduct at
the individual level, but instead seeks the implementation of
questionable governance provisions 33 or, even worse, requires the
corporate defendant to make questionable payments to non-victim
third parties, 34 or hand lucrative contracts to government-chosen
outside monitors. 35
The point here is not that corporate criminal liability is
impossibly flawed.36 Putting aside the practical and theoretical
implications of punishing an organization for being "crimogenic,"
one could at least imagine a plausible legal regime that takes into
31 Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment
Matter?, 19 J.L. & POL'Y (forthcoming Fall 2010).
32 Cf Samuel Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1613, 1615 & nn.3-4 (2007) (contending that public debate of corporate
prosecutions has been, at times, "shallow and even shrill").
33 See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred:
Exploring the Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation,
44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1481, 1500-01 (2007) (describing governance obligations
imposed by prosecutors on Computer Associates and other corporations).
34 See discussion supra note 28.
3 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1384 (describing John Ashcroft's
lucrative deal to monitor a corporation that was the subject of a deferred
prosecution agreement in New Jersey). Negative publicity generated by the
choices and costs of several deferred prosecution-induced monitors drove the
Department of Justice to issue a set of guidelines for prosecutors in choosing
monitors. See Steven R. Peikin, New Guidelines for Corporate Monitors, 1696
PLI/CoRP 681, 683 (2008).
36 Nevertheless, some would say just that. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0.
Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321-22 (1996) (contending
that where corporations are concerned, criminal liability always is less efficient
than civil liability). For a response that corporate criminal liability offers unique
retributive and expressive advantages, see generally Lawrence Friedman, In
Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 833
(2000).
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account the extent of the entity's employee malfeasance and its
group dynamics, issues that Professor Fanto contends are
important to consider. 37 One could also imagine a transparent and
consistent system of corporate rehabilitation, the benefits of which
Professor Henning discusses in his Essay.38 But respondeat
superior liability does not perform either of these functions.
Instead, it leaves corporations entirely dependent on
unaccountable, highly powerful government actors who have their
own personal and institutional interests. 39 It is this very lack of
accountability that creates the possibility for waste and abuse, the
costs of which ultimately fall upon corporate shareholders.40
II. A QUESTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
If we assume that the root cause of corporate misconduct is that
managers and officers cannot achieve previously set performance
goals without resorting to some variety of fraud or intentional
wrongdoing, then the problem is one of corporate governance,
which in turn boils down to a reassessment of how we allocate
power between the owners and managers of the corporate firm.4 1
3 James Fanto, Organizational Liability, 19 J. L. & POL'Y (forthcoming
2010).
38 Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment
Matter?, 19 J. L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2010).
39 For arguments that prosecutors are themselves imperfect agents, see
Bibas, supra note 24, at 963. I also have argued that prosecutors may seek
reforms that are designed primarily to aid in the identification and prosecution of
individuals, rather than to cure structural or cultural governance problems. See
Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What
Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard's Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REv.
523, 526-28 (2008) (arguing that internal policing mechanisms may conflict
with corporate governance norms such as openness and loyalty).
40 These costs fall not only on those shareholders whose companies become
the subject of criminal investigations and prosecutions, but all shareholders
insofar as all companies take unnecessary or costly measures to avoid the
imposition of corporate criminal liability.
41 Jennifer Arlen and William Carney long ago theorized that corporate
fraud results from management's attempt to hide corporate underperformance
and thereby protect their jobs. Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious
Liability for Fraud in Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REv. 691, 694 (1992). But one need not stop at fraud; rational corporate
11I
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As has been observed in multiple venues, shareholders have
little control over the daily affairs of the corporation. For example,
in Delaware-the state of incorporation for a majority of publicly
held corporations-the board of directors retains the legal power to
run the corporation.42 Shareholders retain the power to elect
directors, amend the corporate charter and bylaws, and approve
structural changes such as mergers and sales of substantially all of
the corporation's assets. 43 Beyond these rights, shareholders
remain limited, practically and legally, in what they can do with
regard to the company's internal affairs. "Management" controls
the corporation's information flow, access to its treasury, and in
many respects, access to the corporation's proxy statement.4 Thus,
it is no overstatement when Steven Bainbridge observes that
shareholders, "who are said to 'own' the firm, have virtually no
power to control either its day-to-day operation or its long term
managers seeking to attain previously set performance goals may, when
sanctions and probability of detection are low, choose other forms of legal
noncompliance to the extent noncompliance is cheaper.
42 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(West 2010a). This structure is
replicated in all other states. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 34-35 & n.25 (2008)
(observing that "[i]n all states, the corporation code provides for a system of
nearly absolute delegation of power to the board of directors").
43 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING
CORPORATE LAW 93 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc. 1999). Under the SEC's
shareholder proposal provision, shareholders also may propose and vote on
certain proposals, provided they are "precatory" or non-binding. See id at 157;
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (West 2010).
4 The "proxy" is the statement that enables shareholders to vote on
corporate matters without attending the company's annual meeting. See
generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J.
1259 (2009). In 2009, Delaware amended its code to permit shareholders to
enact bylaws that required the inclusion of certain shareholder nominations on
the corporate proxy, as well as the reimbursement of shareholders following a
successful election. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113. In August 2010, the
SEC increased shareholder access by enacting Rule 14a- 11, which mandates
inclusion in the proxy materials of director nominees of shareholders who meet
minimum requirements set forth in the Rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 1 and the
SEC's discussion of adoption of final rule, Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf.
12
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policies."a5
In an ideal world, the market for corporate control would
render shareholder democracy unnecessary. This market, however,
has been severely hampered by state anti-takeover statutes and
judicially accepted defense mechanisms such as the poison pill.46
Corporate management thus finds itself with a substantial degree
of latitude.
Some contend that this is the optimal structure for promoting
business in a complex economy;47 others lament that it is a recipe
48 dbtfor fleecing dispersed and powerless owners. This debate is far
from resolved by the numerous corporate scholars who have
addressed it, and yet it tends to be ignored by those who populate
the criminal justice world. Federal prosecutors, however hard they
try, cannot begin to address these issues, much less remedy them.
45 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 42, at 3. Moreover, at least prior to the adoption
of Rule 14a-11, shareholders have had little practical ability to unseat the
directors of publicly held companies. "[F]or directors of public companies, the
incidence of replacement by a rival slate seeking to manage the company better
as a stand-alone entity is negligible." Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 677 (2007). For analyses of
whether this inability will change in light of newly enacted Rule 14a-1 1, see
Proxy-Access Forum, THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 26-30, 2010), http://www.the
conglomerate.org/forum-proxy-access/.
46 See generally JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES
KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 118 (2008) (observing that "as the scientific evidence
about the importance of the market for corporate control became so
overwhelming as to be incontrovertible, regulations impeding the market for
corporate control became ubiquitous"). For an explanation of poison pills as
well as a description of other takeover defenses, see generally PINTO &
BRANSON, supra note 43, at 313-16.
47 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 42, at 233.
The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that it
permits the aggregation of large capital pools, but rather that it provides
a hierarchical decision-making structure well-suited to the problem of
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees,
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs. In such a firm,
someone must be in charge ....
Id.
48 Lucian Bebchuk's scholarship presents the strongest case for increasing
shareholder power. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REV. 833 (2005).
13
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Rather, the proper allocation of corporate power is a question for
state legislatures, state courts, and to an increasing degree,
Congress and federal agencies such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC").49 Until the engines of corporate law better
address the governance issues that lurk behind fraud and
misconduct, a number of corporate agents will continue to shirk
and transgress the law, and do their very utmost to hide such
shirking and transgressions. Perhaps criminal law can do some
good on the margins, but its benefits must be viewed against its
costs. If we want deeper and longer lasting change, then we should
probably look beyond the confines of corporate criminal liability,
to corporate law itself.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have pointed out some of the inherent
shortcomings of respondeat superior liability, as well as some of
the underlying tensions between criminal and corporate law. If we
are serious about improving organizational dynamics, or
rehabilitating corporate culture, we must take a look at complex
questions of corporate form and governance and consider the
extent to which those forms increase or decrease the risk of
criminal conduct. If we truly want to inspire long term changes in
corporate culture, then we need to think carefully about how we
might overhaul corporate and securities laws. Such an overhaul, in
turn, would require us to give much greater thought as to how we
can best regulate the corporate firm, our capital markets, and the
economy in general. On the other hand, it might allow prosecutors
to go back to doing what they do best: prosecuting individuals.
49 For the argument that state law responds in large part to federal law's
view of corporate governance, see generally Mark Roe, Delaware and
Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009).
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